(due to the location of those assets), Yahoo! then brought a declaratory judgment action in federal court in California, seeking a declaration that the French judgment was unenforceable in the United States. Although the court did not deny the validity of the French court's jurisdiction or decision, it granted Yahoo!'s motion for summary judgment, finding that enforcement of the judgment would violate the First Amendment.
11 While the Ninth Circuit reversed on other grounds, 12 this practice of reviewing a foreign judicial act using U.S. constitutional standards is nothing new in the realm of foreign judgment recognition. With U.S. courts poised to extend
American free speech protections to expression occurring outside the country, what does this leave for domestic speech regulation based on local community standards, at least when it comes to the Internet?
This paper will explore this question, suggesting the need for a coherent set of principles of jurisdiction and enforcement that recognize the rights of states to set standards for speech within those states. 13 As the development of geo-location technology has made it more feasible to confine Internet regulation to a particular location, the factors cited by the French court to justify jurisdiction -the effect of Internet speech in a particular country, and whether an
Internet provider targeted users within the country -make both theoretical and practical sense.
Such an approach requires sufficient ties to the state where the offense is realized, and also puts Internet Service Providers (ISPs) on notice regarding potential liability. Once such jurisdiction has been properly exercised, foreign courts facing enforcement actions must resist the temptation to impose their own domestic legal (constitutional or otherwise) standards on the foreign 11 Yahoo!,Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (order granting motion for summary judgment); Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (order denying motion to dismiss). 12 Yahoo!, Inc. t this paper, I will use the word "state" to refer to a state in the geopolitical sense. When I specifically mean states of the United States, I will make that clear in context. hoo!, Inc. t this paper, I will use the word "state" to refer to a state in the geopolitical sense. When I specifically mean states of the United States, I will make that clear in context.
judgment, as the District Court did in Yahoo!. While courts in the United States and elsewhere
should not be cornered into enforcing judgments repugnant to fundamental notions of justice, they must also not impose their cultural values upon other sovereign states. As Internet borders become increasingly possible, the law should adjust to permit greater regulation of Internet activity affecting a particular state's polity. Rhetoric about the "global" nature of the Internet should not be permitted to trump the realities of state sovereignty.
II. Jurisdiction & Free Expression
As Judge Fogel noted in Yahoo!, " [w] hat makes this case uniquely challenging is that the Internet in effect allows one to speak in more than one place at the same time." 14 Along with this challenge is the problem that the source of the speech can literally be anywhere in the world.
If such Internet speech should contravene the laws of the speaker's jurisdiction, the receiver' jurisdiction, or any other jurisdiction along the digital pathway of communication, how might a national court justify exercising its jurisdiction over such a case? Although a survey of the different approaches to this jurisdictional question reveals anything but a model of clarity, there emerges a useful set of categories to help frame the discussion: territorial claims, personality and nationality claims, and protective (and other stylized) claims.
With respect to cases involving issues of speech and expression, territorial approaches seem to be the most prevalent. They also provide the most coherent and predictable scheme of jurisdiction, as I will discuss below. However, nationality-based jurisdiction is a regular practice in many states, being asserted over citizens who commit acts abroad that are criminal at home, as well as over citizens who commit acts abroad that are criminal abroad, though not necessarily at home. It is no small matter that the Convention on Cybercrime subscribes to the latter notion, Several other countries, such as Germany, The Netherlands, and Belgium, have similar clauses for various categories of crimes. 17 These countries and others also have provisions for jurisdiction based on the victim's identity, and indeed, certain sections of 18 U.S.C. § 1030 are based on the extent to which conduct affects the federal government as a "victim." 18 In other areas of the law, several states base jurisdiction on a "protective principle" which "allows a state to exercise extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction when the conduct in question is 'directed against crucial state interests, especially state security.'" 19 Parts of § 1030 embody this principle as well. 20 Despite the usefulness of nationality and protective approaches in some contexts, when it comes to Internet expression, the law needs some other solution to the "Yahoo! Problem" -that is, how to assert jurisdiction over a United States company that (passively) allows foreign users access to materials prohibited in their respective countries. In enacting speech restrictions, governments are specifically trying to prohibit the negative effects of that speech within the country. The fact that the harm is specific to the locality helps to explain why we must turn to territorial principles -the most common factor found in jurisdiction provisions 21 The court said that Yahoo! should not be liable for the content of user forums, 41 implying that despite the clear effects within Germany, there must be something more than the mere availability of illegal material to impose liability. In addition to taking into account targeted advertising, other factors courts could take into account might include the extent to which a site uses a foreign language, which has proven to be a key factor with respect to neo-Nazi Web sites based in the United States but written in German. 42 Also, the extent to which a site directs viewers to local information can weigh in favor of asserting jurisdiction in that locality. This variety of values, cultures, and legal systems does not mean we should strive for a universal speech standard, a topic to which I will return below. However, leaving countries free to enact their own speech restrictions and other laws affecting Internet content does not necessarily mean a litigation free-for-all, with company executives globetrotting through courtrooms whenever a foreign prosecutor or litigant stumbles across something offensive. With countries free to regulate within their borders, however, there is a compelling need for a coherent international jurisdictional standard so that content providers are on notice of how they may be subject to suit in foreign jurisdictions. 54 As Geist argues, "[t]he move toward using contract and technology to erect virtual borders may not answer the question of whether there is a there there, but at least it will go a long way in determining where the there might be." speech domestically without affecting speech abroad.
Although these geo-location technologies operate on various levels, the basic mechanism is straightforward. When a Web site receives a request from an Internet user to access a particular page, the server operating that site forwards the requesting user's Internet Protocol (IP) address to its geo-location service provider, which has a working database of the physical locations of many IP addresses currently in use. Based on the information in this database, the geo-location service sends back to the Web site server "an educated guess" of the user's location.
The Web site can use this information to provide targeted advertising and other links, render pages in a particular language, or otherwise provide (or deny) access to particular content.
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The development of this technology has led to new ways to regulate the Internet. For example, China has made rather successfully isolated its users from certain foreign sources of information, countries like Singapore and Saudi Arabia have taken steps to filter specific content, South Korea has banned access to gambling sites, and Iran has made efforts to keep children from using the Internet. 61 As countries continue to look toward the local effects of Internet speech when implementing their laws, "there is a huge incentive for Web site operators to know the location of those who access their content." 62 With many already using geo-location technologies in other contexts, the potential for the regulatory use of such services is there.
The practical availability of regulation for geo-location technologies, however, is hardly by itself a good justification for such regulation, and proposals to "zone" the Internet using geolocation services definitely have their critics. Objections to regulation through such "zoning" on the Internet are both philosophical and pragmatic. For many, the architecture and purpose of the The more pragmatic objections to Internet zoning focus on the fact that geo-location and related technologies are not 100 percent effective, 71 and that their implementation is costprohibitive for many smaller companies and organizations. While it is true that these technologies would not currently achieve the ideal of perfect enforcement, skeptics' criticisms based on technical accuracy ignore the fact that to have the desired regulatory impact, all that is necessary is that such tools be reasonably effective. 72 A regulation "need not raise the cost of the prohibited activity to infinity in order to reduce the level of that activity quite substantially.
regulation increases the cost of access to this kind of information, it will reduce access to this His point, rather, was that 'Law and . . .' courses should be limited to subjects that could illuminate the entire law . . . Dean Casper's remark had a second meaning -that the best way to learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors is to study general rules. Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with people kicked by horses; still more deal with the licensing and racing of horses, or with the care veterinarians give to horses, or with prizes at horse shows. Any effort to collect these strands into a course on 'The Law of the Horse' is doomed to be shallow and to miss unifying principles. Teaching 100 percent of the cases on people kicked by horses will not convey the law of torts very well. Far better for most students -better, even, for those who plan to go into the horse trade -to take courses in property, torts, commercial transactions, and the like, adding to the diet of horse cases a smattering of transactions in cucumbers, cats, coal, and cribs. Only by putting the law of the horse in the context of broader rules about commercial endeavors could one really understand the law about horses."). this deference in a case that is still followed today:
IV. Constitutional Hurdles & International Enforcement
When an action is brought in a court of this country, by a citizen of a foreign country against one of our own citizens, to recover a sum of money adjudged by a court of that country to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff, and the foreign judgment appears to have been rendered by a competent court, having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, and upon due allegations and proofs, and opportunity to defend against them, and its proceedings are according to the course of a civilized jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear and formal record, the judgment . . . should be held conclusive upon the merits tried in the foreign court, unless some special ground is shown for impeaching the judgment, as by showing that it was affected by fraud or prejudice, or that by the principles of international law, and by the comity of our own country, it should not be given full credit and effect. 95 Yahoo!, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192. 96 Bachchan v. India Abroad Pubs., Inc., 154 Misc. 2d. 228, 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (The suit here was the result of a story written by a London author for an Indian news service, about an Indian citizen. Two Indian newspapers in the United Kingdom carried the story, leading Bachchan to sue in England (no doubt due to England's rather plaintiff-friendly defamation laws). The court's refusal to enforce the British judgment in Bachchan is, perhaps, even more distressing than in Yahoo!. At least in Yahoo!, the offending speech originated from servers in the United States, whereas in Bachchan, the speech -from origination to effect -was wholly outside the United States. Yahoo! conflated the very separate issues of speech directed within the country, and speech originating in the country but directed abroad. None of these opinions sheds any light on the courts' conclusions that "limiting speech directed abroad is an effect that comes within the ambit of the First Amendment." 100 Of course, the Internet makes it nearly impossible to classify any speech as completely extraterritorial. But the point is not that the speech itself is limited to any particular jurisdiction. It is that with the ability to geographically restrict who can access Internet speech, there exists the corresponding ability to limit significantly any spillover effects, thus avoiding the chilling of domestically protected speech. While it is comforting to know that U.S. policies to consider when assessing foreign judgments, several of which are relevant to the Internet expression context:
[A] desire to avoid the duplication of effort and consequent waste involved in reconsidering a matter that has already been litigated; a related concern to protect the successful litigant, whether plaintiff or defendant, from harassing or evasive tactics on the part of his previously unsuccessful opponent; . . . an interest in fostering stability and unity in an international order in which many aspects of life are not confined to any single jurisdiction; and, in certain classes of cases, a belief that the rendering jurisdiction is a more appropriate forum than the recognizing jurisdiction, either because the former was more convenient or because as the predominantly concerned jurisdiction or for some other reason its views as to the merits should prevail.
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All of these policies, though not specifically enshrined anywhere in the law, favor enforcement of the French court's judgment in Yahoo!, as well as in other cases involving speech-restrictive laws and enforcement of territorially constrained foreign court orders. That is, while the principles governing the recognition of foreign judgments, including the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act, allow for the refusal to enforce a judgment that is "repugnant to the public policy" of the enforcing state, 103 it is not enough that the judgment differs from what the enforcing state would have done in the first instance. Rather, it "must be so wrong, such a violation of justice, that it works an injustice wherever it may be given effect." 104 Outside the First Amendment context, courts have proven quite unwilling to extend this public policy exception beyond relatively confined circumstances. Although it was hardly a case of constitutional proportions, the Fifth Circuit recently suggested that the public policy exception only applied to situations where the cause of action itself was repugnant to public policy. 105 While it would depend on the level of abstraction at which one defined Internet-speechrestriction causes of action, prosecutions based on speech regulations are not per se against U.S. public policy. Indeed, our own First Amendment jurisprudence recognizes many categories of speech that are unprotected, and which could subject a speaker to both criminal and civil suit. 106 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law recognizes the limited scope of the exception:
the fact that a particular cause of action does not exist or has been abolished in the state where recognition or enforcement is sought . . . does not necessarily make enforcement of a judgment based on such an action contrary to the public policy of the recognizing State or of the United States.
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However strongly we might feel about First Amendment protections in this country, unless it is truly our intent to export U.S. constitutional protections abroad, there is no reason why our interest in protecting free speech at home should trump the interests of other countries in applying their own laws. those interests conflict with free speech. 112 The fact that the major international human rights instruments limit free speech when it comes to the advocacy of ethnic, racial, religious, or other hatred 113 indicates that it is really the United States which is the outlier.
Regardless of where majority opinion lies in terms of substance, those who argue for an untrammeled cyberspace ignore that such an approach, while "liberal" in the sense of nonrestrictive, undermines basic liberal democratic principles. 114 Professor Netanel's analysis of a hypothetical Web site that is based in Texas, accessed in Germany, and is violative of German law illustrates the problem:
[T]o deny Germans the possibility of applying their law to the web site operators would frustrate their fundamental expression of democratic self-rule. . . .
[I]n our increasingly interconnected world (offline as well as online), many local ordinances have spillover effects in other countries. To focus only on whether foreign residents have consented to those effects is to ignore the legislating country side of the liberal democracy equation. When . . . foreign resident conduct has substantial effect within the legislating country and runs strongly against that country's fundamental public policy, the prescriptive outcome of the legislating country's democratic process should prevail.
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Those who decry domestic speech restrictions and the zoning of cyberspace as the "Internet death penalty" imply that such restrictions are evidence of a democratic failure of sorts. But while we have reason to be concerned about, for example, absolute bans on children using the Internet in countries with oppressive, non-democratic regimes, the argument that the welldeveloped democracies of Europe deserve such a paternalistic approach is far weaker.
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There is also much to the argument that the democratic process itself serves as a real check on overly oppressive regulation. "To the extent that societies engage in extensive censorship, they will be marginalized on the Internet. The potential risk of doing business in oppressive societies will serve to discourage companies from supporting those repressive regimes through commercial activities." 117 In the face of such consequences on local commerce, the voters (to the extent that they have a say) would then have to reassess the degree to which they value the speech restrictions. The outcome may be the status quo, but assuming this status quo comes about through the democratic process, there seems to be little in the way of a normative argument justifying the imposition of a global set of Internet values. It is no small fact 115 Id. at 492-93. 116 See also Reidenberg, supra note 109, at 278 ("The empowerment of democratic states through the principles of geographic determinacy and local accountability brings a concomitant concern that non-democratic states will also be able to enforce repressive legal rules. While this concern clearly merits reflection, controlling the behavior of non-democratic regimes is more broadly a question of international law than of this particular technical choice allowing local accountability.") 117 Reidenberg, supra note 109, at 277.
that the United States itself subscribes to this notion of local communities having some control over the standards for expression within those communities. 118 And while the Internet no doubt complicates the idea of what is meant by a "local community," surely it must at least encompass a national citizenry.
All of this raises a more practical question: given the international character of most Enforcement of foreign judgments does require some sort of judicial state action, and thus a court faced with a foreign order is still subject to institutional and constitutional constraints that may be unrelated to the substantive law that is being applied. 120 The problem with this argument and with its proponents' analogy to Shelley v. Kraemer, 121 is that in cases like Yahoo!, the original actor -here, a state actor itself -is not acting contrary to its own laws. Unlike the Shelley context of a court being asked to enforce an action by an actor who himself was operating in the shadow of the U.S. Constitution, in the Yahoo! case, France was clearly not subject to these restrictions. To expect France to allow foreign constitutional interests to trump its own laws is an affront to its sovereignty, particularly when one considers the centrality of hate speech restrictions to much of international law, culture, and society. 122 Indeed, such matters demand care and precision, not, as one writer has put it, "an over-generous enthusiasm."
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V. Conclusion
It is unsurprising that some of the harshest criticism of U.S. "over-involvement" in efforts to regulate the Internet stems from the United States' permissive attitude toward all forms of speech. 124 In a 1998 report on regulating the Internet, the French Council of State illustrated with some clarity the tension caused by disparate approaches to speech regulation, as well as by America's continued role as a safe-haven for hate speech on the Internet:
The point is to prove, once again, the ability of our Old World to imagine tomorrow's world, given our continent's cultural diversity and attachment to the defense of human rights. The general philosophy behind this report might be summed up by the objective whereby digital networks become a space for "world civility." . . . From the European perspective, while the balkanization of the Internet might not be desirable, the American privileging of the market has had a detrimental impact on cultural integrity.
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The struggle between nations over cultural differences is an old and particularly futile one.
Rather than attempt to impose our values on other nations with markedly different histories, cultural values, and legal norms, our interests would be better served by seeking out ways to preserve these differences while accounting for the globalization of commerce and communication. 126 The challenge lies in trying to figure out where to strike the balance between the freedom of speech that is the hallmark of One author's analogy of the Internet to a "global network of big and small spiders and their respective webs linked together in networks," 128 while perhaps now bordering on the cliché, is quite apt when considering the Web's place within a broader cultural framework:
As each spider regulates the infrastructure and content of its section of the web within the framework of its political, social, cultural and economic values, the Internet, like all communication media before it, is becoming what technology, economics, politics and culture make of it. The result is that Internet regulation has begun to reflect the political and cultural complexities of the world. 129 This typology is nothing new. While the Internet may be unique in how quickly it grew to the point of worldwide usage (largely in the absence of a legal framework to govern it), it is not, nor should it be, any more immune from legal rules than any other new technologies. Users have enjoyed more than a decade of the law's playing "catch-up," as it will continue to do for some Indeed, "the initial wave of cases seeking to deny jurisdiction, choice of law, and enforcement to states where users and victims are located constitutes a type of 'denial-of-service' attack against the legal system. . . . [T]he attackers seek to disable states from protecting their citizens online." 130 It is hardly speculation to suggest that endless litigation under the legal system du jour will continue to lead only to legal stalemates and unenforceable judgments. 131 attempt by a state to split the Internet baby, as it were. As the technology of the Internet continues to change, the debate over the best way for states to enforce laws protecting domestic cultural values can evolve alongside it. But the answer must not be that of the "Internet separatists." Regulating the Internet is possible, and grows more possible by the day. Thus, the constitutional capital provided to U.S. judges by the First Amendment's mandate to avoid speech-chilling within the country is slowly vanishing.
In the absence of international agreements on the matter, this leaves us only with comity, which "is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other." 132 But however we characterize it, the Yahoo! case demonstrates that the conflicting values even among the most liberal of the world's democracies will continue to challenge courts whose tendency is to export the First Amendment to the far corners of the 
